

either of the exceptions exist, and the facts of this case have remained materially the same. *Webb, supra*. Accordingly, we must address the merits of Nartron's appeal in relation to its claims regarding the trial court's order awarding attorney fees, costs, and prejudgment interest pursuant to this Court's order and the law of the case doctrine.

Further, this Court ordered the dismissal of that portion of Nartron's appeal regarding the December 19, 2002, order appointing a receiver. This Court specifically determined that the postjudgment order was not a final order in accordance with MCR 7.202(7)(a), and that it was therefore not appealable by right. Nartron acknowledged that the law of the case doctrine applies in its brief on cross-appeal, and that it is bound by this Court's prior ruling. As a panel of this Court has previously dismissed this portion of Nartron's appeal by right and Nartron has made no attempt to properly bring this issue before this Court or to demonstrate that either of the *Webb* exceptions apply, we decline to address this issue based on the law of the case doctrine.

III. Attorney Fees

Regarding the substantive issues raised on appeal, Nartron first argues that the trial court erred in awarding GM attorney fees in this case. We disagree. This Court reviews the imposition of discovery sanctions and the award of costs for an abuse of discretion. *McDonald v Grand Traverse Co Election Comm*, 255 Mich App 674, 697; 662 NW2d 804 (2003).

Nartron first contends that GM should have produced contemporaneous time records for Nartron's inspection.¹ While plaintiff's counsels' failure to keep contemporaneous time records does not require the trial court to reject or reduce the claim for fees as a matter of law, the failure to maintain contemporaneous records could make it difficult for a party to recover fees. *Olson v Olson*, 256 Mich App 619, 636; 671 NW2d 64 (2003).

Here, Nartron acknowledged that it received documentation from GM's counsel regarding the fees charged. Indeed, the record reflects that GM provided to Nartron a complete printout of attorney time records that detailed the date worked, the subject matter, and amount of time spent on the subject for that entry. We cannot envision what more Nartron needed to determine the validity or reasonableness of the work performed. Moreover, Nartron did not make a request for underlying or contemporaneous time records until July 13, 2001, which was five days prior to the date scheduled for the evidentiary hearing, July 18, 2001. Further, the trial court did hold an evidentiary hearing regarding the issue of attorney fees; thus, the trial court complied with Michigan law regarding this issue, and cannot be said to have abused its discretion by not requiring GM counsel to provide additional contemporaneous time records.

Next, Nartron argues that MCR 2.313(B)(5) limits the award of attorney fees to those "caused by" the failure to comply with a discovery order. Nartron contends that GM had the